Europe's population growth is on the verge of turning around, and the almost universal reaction has been panic at the prospect–as if the population it so recently attained is essential to its survival. The reaction illuminates the general infatuation with growth. We heard few questions raised as population grew, but the end of growth is seen as a disaster. I believe that Europe will benefit in several ways from a period of negative population growth, even though the speed and depth of Europe's recent fertility decline will generate some serious transitional problems.
Because its population has stopped growing, Europe is in a better position than most of us to plan for sustainability. Just in time. Past growth has left it with some serious disadvantages. Its environment is under intense pressure simply because it is so densely populated. To provide one example: sulphur oxide (SOX) emissions in the major European countries are much less than in the United States–judged by emissions per capita or emissions per dollar of GNP. But judged by the truly relevant measure of emissions per square kilometer, here are the numbers: US 0.27 kg, France 1.74 kg, Germany, 4.11 kg, Italy 4.37 kg, Spain 3.87 kg. (OECD'99)
Comparable figures can be run on other pollutants. And European forests are under more intense stress than ours from acid precipitation and ozone, simply because the pollution is concentrated in such a small area. Pesticide use per hectare is triple ours. Fertilizer use per hectare in the European Union is twice that in the United States because they pursue maximum yields for food, which leads farmers to use more fertilizer. Consequently, the rivers run full of the residues. The nitrogen load of the Thames is four times that in the Delaware River and 200 times that in the Nile. The Dutch and Danes have actually had to scale back a major industry, hog farming, because the pollution has proven intolerable. In Austria, 35% of mammal species are endangered, 37% of birds and 66% of the fish; for the United States, the percentages are 10%, 7% and 2%.
A lower population will be a tremendous asset as Europe tries to come to terms with its environment. It will be a major help in addressing the energy transition, because Europe is not well endowed with fossil fuels or with sites for windpower or sunlight for solar energy. Those who panic at Europe's population trends should consider those advantages.
The popular press here and in Europe is obsessed by the fear that there will not be enough labor to support aging populations in Europe. I think this topic needs more serious thought and less hype. The "working age population" is a fuzzy construct. The proportion of the "working age" who are actually working varies wildly from society to society and over time. Many of the so-called "working age" people are highly expensive dependents, such as college students or policemen and firemen retired on full pay. Moreover, there is no very precise connection between dependency ratios and economic success. The dependency ratios in Europe at this moment are supposedly highly "favorable", i.e. lots of labor, few dependents–but unemployment is Europe's greatest economic problem. It drives the constant demand for more economic growth. A more important question is: how many of the people are employed?
Let me use Italy as an example; it is supposedly the nation with the direst future. But because of unemployment coupled with liberal welfare and retirement benefits, only 48% of the "working age" population (15-64 years old) is employed. By comparison, the ratio for the United States (adjusted to the same ages) is about 73%.
Now, how desperate does Italy's labor future look? Let me put it this way: if Italy by 2050 put the same proportion of its working age population to work as we now do in the United
States, then 39% of the total population would be working–which is higher than the present 35%. (UN middle projection) Those working people, not the hypothetical "working age population", are the ones who support the rest. Some of the unemployed would be happy to have jobs; others presumably would grumble if they had to work, but the potential labor will be there, if it can be mobilized.
I hope that those numbers will temper the current fears about Europe's population future. Italy like the rest of Europe will have real adjustment problems as the workers age, but they are problems to be solved, not a fundamental threat. For instance, the medical care burden will increase. Early retirement and six weeks of annual vacation may disappear for a time. New arrangements may be needed, like matching older people with jobs suitable for them, or pairing up two semi-retirees to cover one job.
A world of free trade may become simply intolerable for Europe. It will be at an immense competitive disadvantage. Its workers will be in a position to command high salaries, but
European products will be competing against developing countries with a labor surplus. If they can manage that threat, European labor will be in an enviable position.
Europeans must decide to have more children again if their nations are not to disappear. The issue is immediate. In Italy (again the extreme example) current fertility is down to 1.2 children. If it doesn't go up, that would lead to a population descending past eight million in 2100–14% of the present population–unless immigration fills in the decline. On the other hand, a prompt return to replacement level fertility would lead eventually to a population stabilized at about 40% of the present level. This strikes me as a rather attractive prospect, despite the adjustments that will be needed as the process works out.
Italy may even need to reconsider its aversion to immigration, but immigration can play only a limited role. An effort to keep the present ratio of working age residents to those over 64 (for the wildest example) would require that the population treble by 2050, and 79% of the population in 2050 would be post-1995 immigrants or their descendants. (UN Population Division, "Replacement Migration", 3-21-2000) Such a population in that small area would be a disaster.
There is a simple truism: an older population is an inescapable byproduct of the end of population growth, unless the growth is stopped by rising mortality. Unless they want to attempt the mathematical absurdity of perpetual growth, all nations will have to face that reality, and Europe is there now.
To make the adjustment, they will need a massive effort to bring fertility back to replacement level. They will need to figure out how to get more of their members back to work. But they can celebrate the discovery that Europe is on the way to an environmentally sustainable future, unlike the rest of us.
Europe's issues are transitional and manageable. Europe is doing better than the rest of us in controlling its impact on global warming, to take one major current issue. A smaller
Europe will be able to do even better
